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Abstract- Spin Transfer Torque RAM (STTRAM) is a 
promising candidate for Last Level Cache (LLC) due to high 
endurance, high density and low leakage. One of the major 
disadvantages of STTRAM is high write latency and write 
current. Additionally, the latency and current depends on the 
polarity of the data being written. These features introduce 
major security vulnerabilities and expose the cache memory 
to side channel attacks. In this paper we propose a novel side 
channel attack model where the adversary can monitor the 
supply current of the memory array to partially identify the 
sensitive cache data that is being read or written. We propose 
several low cost solutions such as short retention STTRAM, 
1-bit parity, multi-bit random write and constant current write 
driver to mitigate the attack. 1-bit parity reduces the number 
of distinct write current states by 30% for 32-bit word and the 
current signature is further obfuscated by multi-bit random 
writes. The constant current write makes it more challenging 
for the attacker to extract the entire word using a single supply 
current signature. 
Keywords- Side Channel Attack, Last Level Cache, STTRAM, 
Data Privacy. 
I. Introduction 
Spin-Transfer Torque RAM (STTRAM) [1] is promising for 
Last Level Cache (LLC) due to numerous benefits such as 
high-density, non-volatility, high-speed, low-power and 
CMOS compatibility. Fig. 1 shows the STTRAM cell 
schematic with Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ) as the 
storage element. The MTJ contains a free and a pinned 
magnetic layer. The resistance of the MTJ stack is high (low) 
if free layer magnetic orientation is anti-parallel (parallel) 
compared to the fixed layer. The MTJ can be toggled from 
parallel to anti-parallel (or vice versa) by injecting current 
from source-line to bitline (or vice versa). The data in MTJ is 
stored in the form of magnetization. The data stored is ‘1’ if 
the free layer magnetization is anti-parallel to fixed layer 
magnetization and ‘0’ if they are parallel. The read/write 
latency of MTJ depends on the size of the device, current 
passing through the layers as well as on process variation. 
STTRAM depends on ambient parameters like magnetic field 
and temperature that can be exploited to tamper with the 
stored data. The free layer of MTJ flips under the influence of 
external magnetic field which can be exploited by the 
adversary to launch magnetic attacks using a horseshoe 
magnet or an electromagnet [2]. The switching of MTJ 
depends on the ambient temperature, at high temperature the 
MTJ resistance reduces resulting in high read and write 
current [3]. The increased read current leads to read disturb 
failures, where the bits are accidentally flipped during read 
operation because the read current becomes higher than the 
critical current. The temperature can also be exploited to 
extend the retention time of the memory [11]. At lower 
temperature the retention time increases providing more time 
for the adversary to launch attacks in volatile and semi-
nonvolatile memories. The persistent user data in non-volatile 
cache can also be compromised by launching intentional read 
and write operation and probing the data buses after the 
authentic user has logged off. The persistent data leaving the 
cache can also be accessed by probing the data buses 
connecting the cache and CPU and the cache and main 
memory [4].  
Traditional attacks can also be extended for STTRAM such 
as, (a) micro-probing, where conductors are attached to the 
chip surface directly to interfere with the integrated circuit; (b) 
radiation imprinting, where the contents are burned in using 
         
Fig. 1 Schematic of STTRAM bitcell showing MTJ. 
 
 
 
 
Free Layer
Barrier Oxide
Pinned Layer
Bitline
wordline
Source line
MTJ
Parallel
(Low R)
Anti-Parallel
(High R)
MTJ states
(a)        
(b)     
Fig. 2 (a) Write latency; (b) read latency distribution of an 8MB 
STTRAM cache under process variation. The long read and write 
latency presents wider attack window to the adversary. 
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X-Ray radiation to prevent overwriting or erasing of stored 
data; (c) optical probing, where a laser is shinned on the 
surface resulting in activating the underlying circuit. The 
active components glow which can then be used to interpret 
the stored data. 
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) is a technique that interprets 
the measured trace of the supply current to obtain information 
about the ongoing operation. The current in a circuit can be 
measured by inserting a small resistance in series with the 
Vdd or ground rail and then measuring the voltage difference 
(IR) across the resistance which is converted to instantaneous 
current. Sophisticated devices can be used to sample the 
voltage difference at high rates (1GHz) with excellent 
accuracy (< 1% error) [5]. In SPA the adversary uses the raw 
measured current or power information to determine the 
stored data, whereas in differential power analysis (DPA) the 
adversary uses many measurements to filter out noise. While 
SPA exploits the relationship between the executed operation 
and the power leakage, DPA exploits the relationship between 
the processed data and the power leakage [12]. In this work 
we focus on both SPA and DPA to launch side channel power 
analysis attack to obtain the stored data from STTRAM.  
We note the fact that STTRAM is associated with high write 
latency and write current. Furthermore, the write current is 
asymmetric (polarity dependent). These features introduce 
major security vulnerabilities as the adversary can monitor 
these signatures through side channel to compromise data 
privacy. This is especially possible when crypto processors 
employ non-volatile memory (NVM) such as STTRAM to 
store temporary data or the sensitive data is present in the 
NVM cache during operation in raw form. We also propose 
low-overhead techniques to obfuscate the side channel 
signature such as parity encoding, short retention NVM and 
constant current write. To the best of our knowledge this is the 
first effort on STTRAM side-channel attack and preventive 
techniques.  
In particular, we make the following contributions in this 
paper. We propose:  
(i) Novel vulnerabilities such as long write latency, high write 
current and asymmetric read/write currents.  
(ii) Novel side channel attack models to weaken the data 
privacy.  
(iii) Novel design techniques such as short retention 
STTRAM, parity encoding and random write to obfuscate the 
side channel signature 
(iv) Constant current write technique to eliminate polarity 
dependent write current to obfuscate side channel signature. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we 
describe the STTRAM vulnerabilities. The attack model is 
presented in Section III. The preventive measures are 
described in Section IV. Conclusions are drawn in Section V. 
II. STTRAM Vulnerabilities 
In this section we discuss STTRAM vulnerabilities such as 
high latency, high switching current and asymmetric 
read/write current. 
A. Read/Write Latency  
The write latency of STTRAM is a function of thermal 
stability factor (Δt) which in turn depends on the retention 
time. For 10 year retention Δt =40 is required [13] which 
corresponds to a write latency of 0.59ns at 1V supply. 
Furthermore, STTRAM is susceptible to process variation 
(PV) [6] which increases the thermal stability of bits randomly 
especially for larger arrays. Therefore, some bits suffer from 
excessive high read and write latencies. Fig. 2(a-b) shows the 
read and write latency distribution of a 40nmx40nmx4nm 
STTRAM under PV. A 5000 point Monte Carlo simulation is 
performed and the data is extrapolated to 8MB using extreme 
value theory in Matlab. It is observed that the worst case write 
(read) latency is 1.3X (3.4X) the mean value. To avoid read 
and write failures worst case latency is followed for the entire 
memory array which results in longer wordline pulse. The 
longer read and write latency presents more opportunity to the 
adversary to analyze the side channels and weaken the data 
privacy (Section III).  
B. Read/Write Current  
Another aspect of STTRAM is the high write current which is 
dependent on thermal stability, retention time and the polarity 
(a) (b) (c)  
Fig. 3 (a) Supply current waveform for write ‘1’; (b) write ‘0’, and (c) read operations. A significant gap is present between write ‘0’ and ‘1’ 
as well as read ‘0’ and ‘1’ currents which can be employed as signature. Furthermore, the magnitude of write current is a function of stored 
data which also acts as a signature.    
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of the stored data. We assume constant voltage write which is 
commonly employed to simplify the write driver design [6]. 
STTRAM resistance is high (low) during state ‘1’ (‘0’). Fig. 
3(a) shows the supply current waveform for single bit write 
‘1’ when the previous value stored is ‘0’. Intially the current 
is high (STTRAM resistance low) and it goes low after 
successful write (y-axis values are negative). Fig. 3(b) shows 
the supply current waveform for write ‘0’ with previous value 
stored as ‘1’, in this case the current is initially low and goes 
high after successful write. The high and low states of current 
are very distinct and they reveal the information about the 
previous and new data. The current difference between the 
states depends on the Tunnel Magneto Resistance (TMR) of 
STTRAM which is given by (RH-RL)/RL. For robust read 
operation it is desired to have higher TMR which adversely 
affects the data privacy. The read current is comparatively less 
than the write current (Fig. 3(c)), thus the read and write 
operation can be distinctly identified from the current 
waveforms. The source degeneartion based read sensing is 
used in this work [7]. 
C. Temperature Sensitivity  
The thermal stability (Δt) of STTRAM is a function of 
ambient temperature and the write current and write latency 
linearly depends on the thermal stability. The thermal stability 
is given by Δ𝑡 =
𝐻𝑘𝑀𝑠𝐴𝑟𝑡
2𝑘𝐵𝑇
. where Hk = uniaxial anisotropy, 
Ms= saturation magnetization, Ar= area of MTJ, t=thickness 
of free layer, kB= Boltzmann constant, T= ambient 
temperature. 
Colder temperature increases the thermal barrier which in turn 
increases the write current and latency. Fig. 4 shows the write 
latency for different delta values. The write latency increases 
with the increase in thermal barrier. This can be exploited by 
the adversary to strengthen the side channel signature from 
STTRAM. 
III. STTRAM Attack Models 
In this Section we present attack models that builds upon the 
vulnerabilities described in the previous section. 
A. Exploiting Read/Write Current  
The LLC contains sensitive data in raw form such as login, 
password and credit card details entered during a web 
transaction and encryption keys used to encrypt data to be sent 
over the network. In current processor architecture all the user 
data processed by CPU passes through cache memory. The 
adversary can steal the raw data or get clues about the data so 
that he can predict the correct data in linear time. For 
STTRAM LLC the adversary can perform side channel attack 
by monitoring the supply current waveform of the memory 
array. It is assumed that the adversary can monitor the current 
flowing into the memory array from the power supply. Even 
if the adversary has access to processor power supply, it can 
reveal the LLC side channel signature. Fig. 5 shows the write 
current waveforms for 4-bit write operation in STTRAM. Out 
of 16 data values only 5 are unique in terms of total number 
of 0’s and 1’s (1111, 0111, 0011, 0001, 0000). In memory 
array all the bits in a word are written in parallel, thus the order 
of 0’s and 1’s in a word does not affect the supply current 
waveform rather the overall number of 0’s and 1’s in a word 
defines the current signature. For 4 bits all 5 permutations are 
clearly distinct in the current waveform. Knowing the number 
of 0’s and 1’s weakens the security significantly as it reduces 
the reverse engineering effort to identify the correct data. 
B. Exploiting Read/Write Latency  
The high read and write latency provides a larger attack 
window to the adversary. By monitoring the current 
waveforms the adversary can not only predict the number of 
0’s and 1’s in the new data that is being written but can also 
predict the previous data by sampling the current just after the 
wordline is asserted. The adversary samples the current 
during the attack window shown in Fig. 5. The difference in 
current states of each combination depends on the TMR of 
STTRAM as discussed before, higher the TMR more apart are 
the current states. In Fig. 5 the write operation is completed in 
800ps but to avoid write failures under PV the wordline is 
active for longer duration. This gives adversary more time to 
identify the transient current and become more confident 
about the results. Thus, data dependency of current reveals 
 
Fig. 5 Write current for 4-bit write operation 
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Fig. 4 Write latency for different values of thermal barrier.  
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information about the stored and new data and higher latency 
facilitates the attack. The figure also shows the attack window 
available to identify the old and new data. Note that larger 
word size creates more number of states in supply current 
signature however the difference between two consecutive 
states remain the same. Furthermore, larger word size 
increases the total current which makes the attack easier for 
the adversary.  
C. Temperature-Assisted Attack  
The adversary can intentionally increase the write latency by 
lowering the ambient temperature. The MTJ resistance 
increases at lower temperatures which leads to less write 
current. The write latency is directly proportional to the write 
current and thus at lower temperatures the write latency 
increases which provides adversary more time to launch the 
attack.  
IV. Prevention Techniques 
In this section we discuss preventive techniques to obfuscate 
the current signature and/or make the attack difficult or nearly 
impossible. Since the supply current signature is prominent 
during write operation we focus our efforts to obfuscate the 
write current signature. 
 A. Semi Non Volatile Memory (SNVM)  
SNVM is a non-volatile memory with lower retention time. 
The typical retention time for STTRAM is 10 years however 
such high retention time is not required for cache application 
as the data is invalidated when the system restarts or the 
virtual address space is changed. Instead the retention time 
can be lowered to improve the write latency and write current 
[8]. The write latency and write current (I) linearly depends 
on the thermal barrier (Δt) of STTRAM. The retention time (t) 
is exponentially related to Δt by t = C × ekΔt, where C and k 
are fitting constants.  
Both write latency and write current can be lowered by 
reducing Δt which in turn lowers the retention time. Since Δt 
depends on the free layer volume of STTRAM it can be scaled 
to lower the retention time (Fig. 6 (a)). The lower write 
latency due to SNVM reduces the attack window as shown in 
Fig. 4. Lower write current brings the current states closer to 
each other making it difficult to identify the state individually. 
However, simulations (Fig. 6 (b)) show that at low 
temperature the retention time increases dramatically, thus 
giving away the above benefits obtained from lower retention. 
Thus, SNVM cannot be used in isolation to prevent side 
channel attack. 
B. Adding 1-Bit Parity   
The objective of this prevention technique is to merge 
multiple supply current levels in the side channel current 
waveform which will make it difficult for the adversary to 
predict the states accurately. This is achieved by writing an 
extra parity bit along with the original data. Fig. 7(a) shows 
the current waveform of 4-bit write with 1-bit even parity. So, 
instead of writing 4 bits we write 5 bits with the last bit value 
decided by the parity of the 4 bits. By doing this we are able 
to merge 5 states (Fig. 7(a)) into 3 states. Compared to un-
coded data the reverse engineering effort increases because a 
data will map to more number of possibilities. The solution 
works on the principle that the overall write current depends 
on the number of 0’s and 1’s and not on their order. This extra 
1-bit write makes some states identical to each other in terms 
of total 1’s and 0’s. For example, the un-coded 0111 will 
become 01111 which will merge with 1111. Fig. 7(b) shows 
the percent reduction in states with 1-bit parity for different 
word sizes. For a 32-bit word the number of states reduce by 
30%. The reduction in states due to 1-bit parity goes down 
(a) (b)   
Fig. 6(a) Retention time variation with respect to MTJ volume; and, 
(b) retention time dependence on temperature. 
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Fig. 7(a) Current waveform for 4-bit write with 1-bit parity, (b) 
percent reduction in states with 1-bit parity for different word 
sizes. Substantial reduction in states in possible with 1-bit 
parity. 
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with the increase in word size because the effect of 1-bit parity 
gets absorbed by the larger word size. For a 32-bit word the 
effect of single bit is 1/32 whereas for a 256-bit word the 
effect reduces to 1/256. The reduction in states is maximum 
for 16-/bit word, 70% reduction. Below 16-bit the reduction 
rates drops because there are not many states available to 
merge. For a 4-bit word there are 5 states out of which 2 are 
merged by 1-bit parity. Therefore, the 1-bit parity mitigation 
technique works best for 16-32 bit word sizes. 
Note that the overhead associated with parity is negligible for 
practical word sizes. Furthermore, parity encoding is typically 
present in the error correction code (ECC) protected memory 
arrays. Therefore, this technique is easily introduced in the 
design by reusing existing design features.  
C. Adding Random bits in Word 
The reduction is states with 1-bit parity diminishes as the 
word size increases. The signature of the current waveform at 
higher word sizes becomes difficult to interpret as the number 
of states increase. To further obfuscate the signature we 
propose to add multiple random bits in the word during write. 
This technique further complicates and merges the states in 
the supply current signature. The results with addition of 2, 3 
and 4 random bits in the word is shows in Fig. 8. It can be 
observed that the larger number of extra random bits reduce 
the number states substantially for larger word sizes. The 
random bits can be generated by employing a simple pseudo 
random number generator. For larger word sizes the overhead 
from few extra bits is expected to be negligible.  
D. Constant Current Write 
In the previous section it has been noted that asymmetric 
polarity dependent write current is a manifestation of constant 
voltage write. If we write both ‘1’ and ‘0’ with the same 
amount of current, then there will be only one level in the 
current waveform and the write current will only depend on 
the word size. Constant current write can be achieved by using 
a current mirror with voltage controlled current source (Fig. 
9(a)). The two PMOS forms the current mirror whereas the 
NMOS MC controls the current to be mirrored depending on 
the STTRAM resistance [9]. Bias voltage (VB) is adjusted to 
provide the initial read current in the main branch which will 
pass through the STTRAM in the auxiliary branch. However 
constant current write will create mismatch in switching times 
between ‘0’ and ‘1’ states (Fig. 9(b)). This will affect the 
design of the word-line driver but the adversary will have no 
clue about the data as the current will remain constant 
throughout the write access. Since the difference in switching 
current between ‘0’ and ‘1’ is ~0.4ns it is challenging for the 
attacker to extract the entire word using a single supply 
current signature.  
E. Word Size 
The supply current waveform highly depends on the number 
of bits that is being read and written at once i.e., the word size. 
With the increase in word size and under PV the attack 
window for the adversary will reduce. This will affect the 
prediction accuracy and increase the difficulty for the 
adversary to correctly predict the number of 0’s and 1’s stored 
in the memory array. Thus, increasing word size during read 
and write can potentially lower the attack window for the 
adversary. 
V. Discussions 
In this section we discuss the applicability of the proposed 
attack model and countermeasures for various scenarios.  
A. Impact of Scaling  
With technology scaling the MTJ size reduces which lowers 
the free layer thickness. The thermal   stability (Δt) is linearly 
dependent on the free layer thickness and the retention time is 
exponentially related to Δt. Therefore the write latency and 
write current of STTRAM is expected to scale down making 
it more secure against power analysis attack. Introduction of 
perpendicular magnetic anisotropy (PMA) STTRAM makes 
it further challenging for the adversary to perform meaningful 
side channel attack due to inherently lower write latency and 
write current offered by this technology. 
B. Impact of Usage 
Although STTRAM LLC is considered in this paper the 
proposed attack models are equally applicable to the 
STTRAM main memory. Availability of dedicated power 
supply makes it easy to probe main memory active current. 
 
                    (a)                      (b) 
Fig. 9(a) Constant current write circuit; and, [9] (b) write latency 
difference with constant current write. 
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Fig. 8 Percent reduction in states with multi-bit random write 
for different word sizes. 
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However, cryptographic keys cannot be revealed since the 
crypto operations are performed on chip. Nevertheless, the 
raw unencrypted sensitive data can be extracted.  
C. Impact of Magnetic Tampering  
External DC magnetic field of opposite strength could be used 
to increase the switching time of MTJ which will increase the 
attack window for the adversary. Thus, with the help of a 
common horseshoe magnet the adversary can increase the 
write latency to facilitate the attack (especially for constant 
voltage write scheme). 
D. Cache Timing Attack  
In shared computer the main memory and hard disk are 
protected against use by another user on the same machine but 
the cache is not. If two users are working on the same machine 
the malicious user can fill the entire cache with his own data 
and wait for the other user to perform secret operations like 
encryption. The malicious user then measures the loading 
time to find which of his data has been replaced by the other 
user and learns about the cache addresses used in encryption. 
This timing information can be exploited for key recovery of 
encryption algorithms like AES [14]. Since a larger cache size 
can be afforded with STTRAM (due to smaller footprint 
bitcell) the number of cache line replacements is expected to 
be less alleviating the cache timing attack. However the 
persistence of data can be exploited to launch the attack at a 
later time to retrieve the sensitive information.  
E. Other Side Channels  
STTRAM resistance in the parallel and anti-parallel state is in 
the range of KΩ (5K-10K) and the write current is in the order 
of µA (100-150 µA). Thus, the IR drop will be in the order of 
mV resulting in considerable droop in supply voltage. The 
adversary can monitor the droops in supply voltage to identify 
write operation and the amount of droop can give out the 
information about the data being written much similar to 
supply current.   
VI. Conclusions 
In this paper we showed that STTRAM read/write current, 
latency and asymmetricity can be security vulnerabilities. We 
presented novel side channel attack models for STTRAM to 
compromise the sensitive data in LLC. We also provided a 
suite of preventive countermeasures such as constant current 
write, increased word size, SNVM and parity bit encoding to 
increase the reverse engineering effort required by the 
adversary to decipher the data from read and write current 
waveforms. The proposed techniques showed significant 
promise to protect against data privacy attacks to enable 
secure NVM design.  
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